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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has regulated competi-
tive business activities since its inception in 1915.1 Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) empowers the Commission
to enjoin certain unfair -and deceptive business practices. 2 As is the
* Associate Professor, East Carolina University. B.A., 1973, M.S., 1974, M.P.A., 1974, Syr-
acuse University; J.D., 1981 Tulane University. Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)).
2. As originally written, section 5 stated: "That unfair methods of competition in com-
merce are hereby declared unlawful." FTCA, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719. This provision was
subsequently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to mean that only competi-
tive practices that affected other businesses could be challenged under the statute. See FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931). In 1934, the court recognized that unfair methods
of competition could harm consumers. See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
The Court in Keppel was particularly troubled by the company's advertising campaign be-
cause it exploited children. Id. at 313. The Court said that the unfair methods phrase was
subject to re-interpretation: "It is unnecessary to attempt a comprehensive definition of the
unfair methods which are banned, even if it were possible to do so .... New or different
practices must be considered as they arise in the light of the circumstances in which they
are employed." Id. at 314.
The FTC's regulatory authority was expanded with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act in
1938. Section 5 of the FTCA was amended to include those business activities which only
had an impact on the consumers: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Wheeler-Lea Act,
ch. 49, § 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. Section 45). Senator Wheeler,
co-sponsor of the Act, summarized the purposes of the proposed amendment:
Section 5 of the present act is amended, first, by making unlawful "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce." The present act makes unlawful "unfair methods
of competition," and the Supreme Court has held that the Commission loses jurisdic-
tion of a case where an actual or potential competitor is not involved. This amend-
ment makes the consumer who may be injured by an unfair trade practice of equal
concern before the law with the merchant injured by the unfair methods of a dishon-
est competitor ....
[T]his legislation is designed to give the Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction
over unfair acts and practices for consumer protection to the same extent that it now
has jurisdiction over unfair methods of competition for the protection of competitors.
83 CONG. Ruc. 3255-56 (1938).
The Wheeler-Lea Act had been prompted by a series of cases which had narrowly con-
strued the "unfair methods of competition" provision of the 1914 FTCA. In Raladam, the
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case with other regulatory statutes, Congress chose not to define
certain terms in the FTCA, such as "deceptive,"4 leaving this task
to the FTC and the federal courts. The result has been a steady
United States Supreme Court stated that it would not overstep what it perceived to be the
legislative prerogative:
[T]he word "competition" imports the existence of present or potential competitors
• . . the trader whose methods are assailed as unfair must have present or potential
rivals in trade whose business will be, or is likely to be, lessened or otherwise in-
jured. . . . If broader powers be desirable they must be conferred by Congress. They
cannot be merely assumed by administrative officers; nor can they be created by the
courts in the proper exercise of their judicial functions.
Raladam, 283 U.S. at 649.
Also, in Pan Am. World Airways v. U.S., 371 U.S. 296 (1963), the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the standard for what constitutes an unfair method of competition or unlawful
practice must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 307-08. The Court noted that
"[tihe committee was of the opinion that it would be better to put in a general provision
condemning unfair competition than to attempt to define the numerous unfair practices,
such as local price cutting, interlocking directorates, and holding companies intended to
restrain substantial competition." Id. at 306-07, citing S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. 13
(1914).
3. The Securities Act of 1933 does not specifically define a "security," but rather pro-
vides a list of transactions as examples. See § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982). Similarly, the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contains a list of transactions virtually identical to the
1933 Act, and does not specifically define "security." See § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10)
(1982); see also S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) ("[the definition of a
security] embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation
to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits."); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 847-48 (1975) ("[Congress] sought to define 'the term security in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security,'" (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933))); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)
("[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.").
4. Although some statutory definitions are provided in FTCA section 55, they have been
held inapplicable to any action commenced under section 45. See, e.g., Fresh Grown Pre-
serve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942); see also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 385 (1965) ("[T]he proscriptions in Section 5 are flexible, 'to be defined with par-
ticularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business.' (quoting, FTC v. Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953))).
5. [The FTCA] necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in interpreting Sec-
tion 5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprecedented
situations. Moreover, as an administrative agency which deals continually with cases
in the area, the Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine
when a practice is "deceptive" within the meaning of the Act. This Court has fre-
quently stated that the Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by review-
ing courts. This admonition is especially true with respect to allegedly deceptive ad-
vertising since the finding of a Section 5 violation in this field rests so heavily on
inference and pragmatic judgment.
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (footnotes omitted); see also FTC v.
National Lead, 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13
(1946); Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978); Fedders
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flow of federal case law clarifying the definition of a deceptive bus-
iness act or practice.'
James C. Miller, III, the former Chairman of the FTC,7 was in-
strumental in the abandonment of the FTC's traditional definition
of "deception." Testifying before Congress in 1982, Miller stated:
There are specific problems with the Commission's definition of de-
ception. First, the definition is not clear, despite its 44 year history.
The courts tend to give the Commission very wide latitude, and the
Commission's own case law is not clear and consistent. As a result,
businesses do not know what they can and cannot do. Consumers do
not know what protections they do and do not have. The Commis-
sion really does not know what cases to bring and what not to bring,
and the courts do not know which Commission decisions to affirm
and which to reverse. As a result, they tend to defer to the agency.'
Miller strenuously advocated that a deceptive act be defined as a
"material representation that is likely to mislead consumers, act-
ing reasonably in the circumstances to their detriment."9 The
courts defined deception according to whether an act or practice
had the "tendency or capacity" to deceive. The minority commis-
sioners charged Miller with deliberately attempting to subvert this
pro-consumer position.1°
Chairman Miller actively lobbied Congress to amend section 5 of
Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 481 F.2d
246, 248 (6th Cir. 1973).
The courts have recognized the role of other agencies in determining workable definitions
for statutorily undefined terms, such as in securities law: "The task has fallen to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the Securities
Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial transac-
tions in our society [constitute a "security" and] come within the coverage of ... the [1933
and 1934] statutes." Forman, 421 U.S. at 848.
6. See infra notes 17.36 and accompanying text.
7. James C. Miller, III became Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission on Septem-
ber 30, 1981. Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1987, at A24, col. 1. Miller was later confirmed by the
Senate to become Director of Office of Management and Budget. Advertising Age, Oct. 7,
1985, at 8, col. 4. FTC Commissioner Terry Calvani then became acting Chairman. Advertis-
ing Age, Oct. 10, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
S. FTC's Authority over Deceptive Advertising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Con-
sumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1982) [hereinafter Deceptive Advertising Hearings].
9. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Miller added that "a material representation that the
representor knew or should have known would be misleading" would also constitute a de-
ceptive act. Id.
10. Id. at 59-62 (statement of Commissioner Bailey); and 67-71 (statement of Commis-
sioner Pertschuk).
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the FTCA to include a definition of "deceptive" trade acts. In Oc-
tober 1983, the Commission majority drafted a Deception Policy
Statement in response to a request from the House Committee on
Commerce for clarification of the FTC's deception policy." Con-
gress did not respond favorably to this Policy Statement,12 so in
1984, the Commission majority adopted the reasonable consumer
deception standard in the case of In re Cliffdale Associates's over
the objections of the minority commissioners.14 Since 1984, the
FTC has decided four cases15 relying on the Cliffdale holding.
This article will review the development of the existing federal
deception standard and focus on the efforts of the Miller Commis-
sion to abolish the traditional standard. Additionally, the Cliffdale
case line will be analyzed in an effort to determine whether a sig-
nificant change in the burden of proof has been established by vir-
tue of the 1983 Policy Statement.16
II. PRE-1982: "TENDENCY OR CAPACITY TO DECEIVE"
The traditional deception standard, is composed of three basic
elements: (1) the act or practice must have a tendency or capacity
11. The Commission had been requested to:
[P]repare an analysis of its deception jurisprudence as presently applied by the Com-
mission and interpreted in case law. If the Commission adopts this analysis, the Com-
mission shall submit such analysis to the Committee. That analysis should include a
decision of whether a need exists to provide a statutory definition of deception, and,
if the Commission concludes that such a definition is necessary, the Commission shall
provide the Committee with proposed language for such a definition. The Committee
is mindful of the fact that the Commissioners have expressed different views on this
subject at our hearings and requests that, if appropriate, each Commissioner fully
elaborate these individual views for the Committee.
REPORT OF THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Au-
THORIZATION OF 1982, S. REP. No. 97-451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16; H.R. REP. No. 98-156, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, 5 (1983). The Commission's Deception Policy Statement is appended
to the majority opinion in In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984).
12. Congress did not adopt the Section 5 amendment that was part of the Federal Trade
Commission Authorization Act of 1983, H.R. 2970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also
infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
13. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
14. The majority was comprised of Chairman Miller and Commissioners Douglas and
Calvani. Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk agreed with the result but dissented over the
application of a new deception standard. Id. at 184, 189.
15. In re Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313 (1986); In re Southwest Sunsites, 105 F.T.C. 7
(1985); In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984); In re Thompson Medical
Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984). For a complete discussion of the FTC's deception policy as ap-
plied in these cases, see infra notes 123-197 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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to deceive, 17 (2) the reaction of only the targeted audience must be
evaluated,18 and (3) the act or practice must be material. 9 In eval-
uating whether the practice had a tendency to deceive, the FTC
did not have to find actual deception.20 The act or practice was
reviewed as a whole.21 If the act or practice had a propensity to
17. Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.11 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Ad-
vertisements having the capacity to deceive are deceptive within the meaning of the FTCA
.... ") (emphasis added) (weight loss clinic had promoted drug as being safe and effective
against obesity, leading consumers reasonably to believe that the product had received FTC
approval); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T]he Commission
was entitled to conclude from the advertisements themselves and stipulations of fact that
the ads had a tendency or capacity to mislead consumers.") (emphasis added); see also
American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982); Beneficial Corp. v.
FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Resort Car Rental
Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Doherty, Clif-
ford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th
Cir. 1957); Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025
(1957); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1944); Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1940).
18. The Supreme Court has noted that children "constitute an especially vulnerable and
susceptible class requiring special protection from business practices that would not be un-
lawful if they only involved adults." FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. at 313. The Kep-
pel court held that an act or practice that interfered with a child's free choice could be
construed as unfair or deceptive even if the act in question was not particularly pernicious
to adults. Id; see also Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule: Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8357-59 (1964) [hereinafter Statement of Basis and Purpose].
19. Although section 5 of the FTCA does not specifically include materiality as part of
the unfairness and deception standards, the term is mentioned in the definition of false
advertisement:
The term "false advertisement" means an advertisement other than labeling, which
is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any advertisement is
misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only represen-
tations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combina-
tion thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts mate-
rial in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates
under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement or under such conditions as are
customary or usual.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
20. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery
Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922); American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 687; Trans World Ac-
counts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979); Resort Car Rental Sys., 518 F.2d at
964; Montgomery Ward & Co., 379 F.2d at 670; Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 883-84 (9th Cir.
1960); Herzfeld v. FTC, 140 F.2d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp.,
134 F.2d at 680; Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943); Pep Boys -
Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
21. The Commission's right to scrutinize the visual and aural imagery of advertisements
[or any other business act or practice] follows from the principle that the Commission
looks to the impression made by advertisements as a whole. Without this mode of
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deceive, the FTCA was violated.22
It was also possible to run afoul of section 5 by failing to disclose
all pertinent information. These "omission" cases looked to the im-
pression that was conveyed by the party responsible for the non-
disclosure of information.23 Very often the omitted information
was material to an informed consumer choice, and the Commis-
sion's position was that absent the additional information, the
practice was deceptive per se.24
The Commission has been careful not to impose section 5 liabil-
ity where the representation was mere sales talk or puffing.25 Con-
examination, the Commission would have limited recourse against crafty advertisers
whose deceptive messages were conveyed by means other than, or in addition to, spo-
ken words.
American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 688 (emphasis added); see also Feil, 285 F.2d at 886
n.15.
In some cases, the FTC found deception in a representation that was factually correct-
"Words and sentences may be literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a
setting as to mislead or deceive." Bockenstette, 134 F.2d at 371; see also Carter Prods. v.
FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963); Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 208 F.2d 382, 387 (1953); P.
Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
22. The traditional deception standard has not always been phrased in terms of a ten-
dency or capacity to deceive. See Montgomery Ward, 379 F.2d at 670 ("[T]he likelihood of
deception or the capacity to deceive is the criterion by which the advertising is judged.")
(emphasis added). Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), (the likelihood
or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is measured), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 983 (1977); see also Feil, 285 F.2d at 886 n.15, 896 (court used "tendency to
deceive" and "likelihood to deceive" interchangeably).
23. In Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922), the company had sold
tartar baking powder for over fifty years. The powder was considered unique due to the
tartar ingredient. When the manufacturer deleted tartar from the ingredients and substi-
tuted the less expensive phosphate, it continued to use packaging, labels, and advertise-
ments stating that tartar was an ingredient in the powder. Id. at 747-48. The FTC issued an
affirmative disclosure order requiring the company to include the word "phosphate" in the
product's name. Id. at 753.
When the Commission issues an affirmative disclosure order, the company has two alter-
natives: 1) include the omitted information in future dealings with consumers, or 2) cease
the practice in question. By contrast, the "corrective order" is designed to correct a false
impression conveyed by a previous practice which was persuasive to the consuming public.
See generally Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 950 (1978).
24. The Commission's power to impose affirmative disclosure orders has been affirmed
by the Supreme Court:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to elimi-
nate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide
latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy se-
lected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946); see also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 473 (1952); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957).
25. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1938) (safety glass
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sumers are generally regarded as being capable of protecting them-
selves from such persuasive efforts. In evaluating sales claims, the
FTC determined whether under its interpretation, the puffing fell
short of deception.26
Akin to puffing are representations that are susceptible to two
interpretations, at least one of which is misleading. This type of
problem arises most often in advertising cases. The FTC has con-
sistently held that such double entendres constitute deceptive
practices in violation of section 5.27
In establishing the "audience reaction" requirement, the FTC
did not consider the reactions of all those persons within the entire
pool of potential victims. Instead, the Commission carved a target
audience from this group. The Commission asked whether a "sub-
stantial number" 2s of people within the group could possibly have
been deceived. This test has been called the "substantial percent-
age,' '29 "substantial portion,"30 and "substantial segment test.""1
The FTC has never established an exact number of affected people
required in order to find an act deceptive. However, one court went
so far as to hold that the deception standard should be expanded
was advertised as providing the "greatest available protection" to the consumer against in-
jury); Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1946) (court acknowledged that peti-
tioner's description of his product as "perfect" was "not calculated to deceive"). But cf.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (manufacturer's claims of
a "safe tire" went beyond mere puffing and contained guarantees of absolute safety), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
26. Former Chairman Miller did not agree with this approach to expressions of opinion.
He felt that they should be subject to the reasonable consumer standard. See Deceptive
Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 11-12.
27. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977) (chal-
lenging a trade association's claim that there was no scientific evidence linking the con-
sumption of eggs with an increased risk in heart disease), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
The FTC's investigation of opinion statements has always focused on the potential for mis-
leading consumers:
While the courts still make occasional reference to the fact-opinion distinction, they
recognize no privilege for statements of opinion in advertising, and invariably regard
as a deceptive and unlawful representation any opinion stated in such a manner as to
mislead the consumer. The traditionally broad scope of permissible "puffing" has
been narrowed to include only expressions that the consumer clearly understands to
be pure sales rhetoric on which he should not rely in deciding whether to purchase
the seller's product.
Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 18, at 8351.
28. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 85 F.T.C. 688, 744 (1975).
29. See Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 319-20 (1965).
30. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
31. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 18, at 8350.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:399
to protect even "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous."3
The final element of the traditional deception standard required
that the representation or omission be material.3 3 Although the
FTC has provided no definitive guidance, a representation was
considered material if the consumer relied upon it in reaching a
decision relative to the product.34 The United States Supreme
Court has stated "the public is entitled to get what it chooses,
though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or per-
haps by ignorance. '3 5 Historically, the Commission has not re-
quired that a consumer suffer an actual injury in order to satisfy
the materiality requirement.3 6
III. 1982-1984: THE COMMISSION'S POLICY STATEMENT ON
DECEPTION
Shortly after being named Chairman of the Commission,3 7 Mr.
Miller sparked controversy with his public statements regarding
the FTC's substantiation doctrine. 8 Appearing before the Associa-
32. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
33. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1965). Information may also be
material if it relates to the use of a product. See, e.g., In re American Motors Corp., 100
F.T.C. 229 (1982) (comparing the maneuverability of jeeps and passenger cars on paved
surfaces), vacated on other grounds, 105 F.T.C. 194 (1985) (new regulation of National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration covered same subject matter as FTC's order); Inter-
national Harvestor Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) (information concerning a safety hazard asso-
ciated with the operation of tractors).
34. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165-66 (1984) ("[A] material representa-
tion, omission, act or practice involves information that is important to consumers and,
hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product.") (emphasis added).
Materiality may, however, be inferred where the Commission has found a false claim. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391-92.
35. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
36. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (1967); Resort Car Rental
Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (1975) (quoting Algoma, 291 U.S. at 78; Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d
879, 896 (1960)). Former Chairman Miller labored to have the injury requirement made an
integral part of the reasonable consumer standard, and he incorporated it in the Commis-
sion's Policy Statement on Deception. See, e.g., Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 183. However, the
concept was diluted in Cliffdale: "Consumers thus are likely to suffer injury from a material
misrepresentation. A review of past Commission deception cases shows that one of the fac-
tors usually considered, either directly or indirectly, is whether or not a claim is material."
103 F.T.C. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). See infra notes 117-22 and
accompanying text.
37. See supra note 7.
38. The FTC's substantiation doctrine was formalized in In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23
(1972). The company had made claims regarding a non-prescription remedy for burns called
Un-Burn, stressing its pain-relieving abilities. The company contended that these claims
were supported by bona fide scientific tests. Id. at 66-68. No such tests had been performed.
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tion of National Advertisers, he questioned what amount of sub-
stantiation the Commission should require and whether the Com-
mission should mandate any substantiation requirement before the
claim is made. 9 These comments indicated that Miller had defi-
nite ideas about how the scope of the FTC's section 5 power should
be altered with respect to deception.
In 1982, Chairman Miller testified before Congress about the de-
sirability of a statutory definition of deception.4 ° He stated that
the ad hoc decisionmaking of the Commission in this area had
"done consumers more harm than good." '41 The central issue was
the traditional deception standard's broad prohibition of acts and
practices that "could benefit the majority of consumers," but
which had been held deceptive due to a "tendency to mislead an
unreasonable few."' 42 Miller also accused the agency of pursuing
trivial cases, thereby wasting valuable Commission resources.43 He
concluded by recommending that Congress define a deceptive act
or practice as a "material misrepresentation that: (a) Is likely to
mislead consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, to their
detriment; or (b) The representor knew or should have known
would be misleading.
44
The full Commission upheld dismissal of Pfizer's appeal, but also held that where a product
claim is not supported by a "reasonable basis," it would be considered an unfair and decep-
tive act violative of the FTCA. Id. at 64. The Pfizer substantiation doctrine had become an
industry standard and experts were understandably concerned about the official policy
which would replace it.
39. Advertising Age, Nov. 16, 1981, at 107, col. 1. In addition to seeking support for his
efforts to narrow the Commission's authority, Chairman Miller also testified before the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee that the FTC's budget should be cut by over $10 million. See
Advertising Age, Nov. 2, 1981, at 102, col. 2.
40. Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Mr. Miller elaborated:
The Commission also has challenged alleged deceptive acts and practices that are
not likely to cause consumers any injury. In these cases, the Commission's scarce
enforcement resources have been squandered on the trivial. Examples of this. . . are
Commission cases challenging discount pricing claims and claims concerning products
that are low in price, are frequently purchased, and are easy to evaluate.
Id. (emphasis added). The injury/detriment requirement was included in this version of the
deception standard. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
44. Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 8-9. Chairman Miller reiterated his
preference that Congress change the deception standards. id. at 20. He also argued that a
change in the statutory standard would promote Commission accountability and judicial
review:
A statutory definition will promote accountability ...because the Commissioners
decide for themselves how they want to use their broad discretion. And when the
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Congress did not enact a statutory definition as part of FTCA
section 5,45 However, the House Committee on Commerce asked
the Commission to prepare a statement detailing its deception en-
forcement policy. 46 In October 1983, Miller provided a statement
which was to become known as the Commission's 1983 Policy
Statement on Deception.47 The Committee rejected the Policy
Statement because it failed to meet the Committee's request for a
"definitive, neutral analysis" of deception enforcement policy.
48
The Committee viewed the statement as a rehash of the deception
composition of the Commission changes, so too do the standards.
Moreover, a statutory definition will facilitate judicial review. Courts routinely de-
fer to the decisions of the Commission-regarding deception. This is one reason why
"the Commission has managed to prevail in the appellate courts in the overwhelming
majority of its [deception] decisions that have been appealed." A statutory definition
will provide guidance to the courts by spelling out the standards upon which their
review should be based.
Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Other organizations offered alternative definitidns for a deception standard at the same
hearings. The Chamber of Commerce suggested that acts or practices be classified as decep-
tive which:
(a) consist of material representations known to be false or made in reckless disre-
gard or their truth of falsity, or (b) directly cause or may foreseeably result in sub-
stantial economic injury to consumers and such injury is neither reasonably avoidable
by consumers themselves nor outweighed by countevailing [sic] benefits to consumers
or competition.
Id. at 108 (statement of Bert W. Rein on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
45. Although somewhat different from Chairman Miller's version, the proposed statutory
deception definition did retain the "substantial injury" requirement:
(B) An act or practice in or affecting commerce shall be considered to be an unfair
act or practice under subparagraph (A) if-
(i) such act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers;
and
(ii) such substantial injury (I) is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (II) is
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition which
result from such act or practice.
Any determination under the preceding sentence regarding whether an act or practice
is an unfair act or practice shall take into account, in addition to other relevant fac-
tors, whether such act or practice violates any public policy as established by Federal
or State statutes, common law, practices in business or industry, or otherwise. This
subparagraph shall not have any force or effect, and shall not be taken into account,
in connection with the enforcement of any State law which prevents persons, partner-
ships, or corporations subject to the jurisdiction or the State from engaging in unfair
acts or practices.
H.R. 2970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
46. See supra note 11.
47. The Commission's 1983 Policy Statement on Deception can be found at 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 50,455 (Oct. 31, 1983); 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at
689 (Oct. 27, 1983); and in an appendix to In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84
(1984).
48. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 56,086 (Oct. 31, 1983).
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standard that Congress refused to codify.49 The Committee re-
turned the report to the Commission with instructions to compile a
more factual, less argumentative summary.50 Although Chairman
Miller formally responded to the Committee's rejection of the Pol-
icy Statement,51 the Policy Statement's deception definition be-
came the cornerstone of future Commission deception enforcement
policies, despite Congressional objections.
The Policy Statement abandoned the language of the traditional
deception standard, defining a deceptive act as "a representation,
omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment. ' '52
The Commission recast the materiality requirement of the tradi-
tional standard in terms of "consumer injury.
5 3
It is imperative to recognize that Chairman Miller believed this
new standard to be merely an accurate articulation of the standard
which had been established by Commission case law over the pre-
vious fifty years. In effect, he saw no change in standards at all.
Miller relied on Beneficial Corp. v. FTC54 to support the new
standard's requirement that a representation, omission, or practice
be "likely to mislead" the consumer. In Beneficial, a finance com-
pany advertised that it would provide the consumer with an "In-
stant Tax Refund" if the individual's tax return entitled her to a
refund.5  Actually, the applicant had to qualify for a loan accord-
ing to normal company procedures, and there was nothing "in-
stant" about the loan transaction.56 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the FTC's order, finding the practice decep-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 56,086-89.
52. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 176 (1984).
53. Id. at 175-76.
54. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 613-14.
56. Id. at 617. The court quoted the Commission's conclusion on this point:
The early Instant Tax Refund advertising is, on its face, totally misleading about the
true nature of Beneficial's offer. Instead of making clear that Beneficial is simply
offering its everyday loan service, the advertising implies that Beneficial will give a
special cash advance to income tax preparation customers with a government refund
due, in the amount of their refund. The natural impression, since the Instant Tax
Refund is stressed as exclusive and special is that this cash advance is different from
a normal consumer loan.
1988]
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tive. 57 The court noted that "the FTC has been sustained in find-
ing that advertising is misleading even absent evidence of that ac-
tual effect on customers; the likelihood or propensity of deception
is the criterion by which advertising is measured."58
The Policy Statement, however, seems to equate the "likely to
deceive" requirement with actual deception. Historically, the Com-
mission has not required actual deception in order to hold a prac-
tice deceptive. 59 Furthermore, the Policy Statement emphasizes
the court's use of the term "likelihood" in Beneficial. However, a
complete reading of the opinion reveals that the court viewed
"likely to mislead" and "tendency to deceive" as the same
standard. 0
The Policy Statement standard also requires consumers to act
reasonably in interpreting seller's representations. 1 The Commis-
sion has always focused upon the targeted group's interpretation of
the sales practice in question. 2 The Policy Statement also adds
that this focus should evaluate the "effect of the practice on a rea-
sonable member of that group. '6 3 Thus, the Policy Statement
stresses that the deception standard has not been applied to pro-
tect those few people whose misunderstanding of a sales practice is
unreasonable. These unfortunate few represent "an insignificant
57. Id. at 621.
58. Id. at 617 (emphasis added). The court agreed with that portion of the Commission's
order which required the deletion of the phrase "Instant Tax Refunds" from Beneficial Cor-
poration's advertising. Id. Interestingly, the FTC modified its cease and desist order in 1986
to permit the company to use the prohibited term in its advertising. The FTC modified its
decision because of the IRS' development of 1) an electronic filing system which reduced the
turnaround time for refund payments, and 2) new procedures allowing persons who were
entitled to refunds to secure interest free bank loans. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, Dkt. 8922
[1983-1987 Transfer Binder] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,410 (Nov. 3, 1986).
59. See Beneficial, 542 F.2d at 617; see also In re CIiffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165
(1984) ("The requirement that an act or practice be 'likely to mislead,' for example, reflects
the long established principle that the Commission need not find actual deception to hold
that a violation of Section 5 has occurred.").
60. In the same paragraph, the court it also referred to the traditional "tendency to
deceive" language three times:
The parties agree that the tendency of the advertising to deceive must be judged by
viewing it as a whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their
context. . . .Whether particular advertising has a tendency to deceive or mislead is
obviously . . . more closely akin to a finding of fact than to a conclusion of law. At
the same time, evidence that some customers actually misunderstood the thrust of
the message is significant support for the finding of a tendency to mislead.
Beneficial, 542 F.2d at 617.
61. See Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 177 (Policy Statement).
62. Id. at 177-78.
63. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the
representation is addressed." 4
The "reasonable consumer" standard is based upon the premise
that consumers generally are capable of protecting themselves
from unscrupulous trade practices. The free enterprise system
should therefore be permitted to determine the validity of adver-
tising claims.6 5 The Policy Statement makes clear that subjective
claims about the taste, feel, appearance and smell of a product fall
into the category of conduct which should be market controlled. 6
The Policy Statement also asserts that sellers do not benefit from
deceiving consumers where the product can be easily evaluated, is
inexpensive, and is frequently purchased. Sellers want repeat
purchases and to the extent that they make false claims about the
product they will lose repeat purchases. The Policy Statement con-
cludes that the Commission should carefully evaluate such product
claims before issuing a formal complaint.
6 7
Although the Policy Statement based its reasonable consumer
requirement on In re Kirchner,"s its reliance upon that case may
64. Id. (citing In re Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963)); In the Deceptive Advertising
Hearings, supra note 8, at 10, where Chairman Miller discussed expense of providing accu-
rate information to consumers and the impact that excessive government regulation has on
this process. Mr. Miller concluded that "we should be careful not to intervene just because a
small minority of consumers acting unreasonably might be misled." Id. at 10.
65. According to Chairman Miller:
[B]y impairing the efficient operation of the advertising market, such over-zealous
enforcement might ultimately compound this harm to consumers by reducing compe-
tition among sellers of goods and services. The marketplace operates more vigorously
and more responsively when consumers are aware of alternative sellers, products and
prices. To the extent information concerning these choices becomes more costly to
obtain, less information will be produced and disseminated, and consumer awareness
about potential choices will be diminished. The result is a less competitive market-
place, with higher prices and fewer real choices.
Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 10 (emphasis added).
66. See 103 F.T.C. at 181. The Commission also noted that it would not bring an adver-
tising case "on correctly stated opinion claims if consumers understand the source and limi-
tations of the opinion."
67. Id.
68. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963). The Policy Statement cited the following example to support
the argument that existing case law embraces the reasonable consumer requirement:
An advertiser cannot be charged with liability with respect to every conceivable mis-
conception, however outlandish, to which his representations might be subject among
the foolish or feeble-minded. Some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension,
may be misled by even a scrupulously honest claim. Perhaps a few misguided souls
believe, for example, that all "Danish pastry" is made in Denmark. Is it, therefore, an
actionable deception to advertise "Danish pastry" when it is made in this country? Of
course not. A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely because it
will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment
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be misplaced. 9 The opinion does not directly address the reasona-
bleness requirement, and the cases cited by the Kirchner opinion
refer to the Commission's policy of concluding that a statement is
misleading where two interpretations are possible. 70 The "tendency
to deceive" standard included ambiguous representations and con-
strued them in the light least favorable to the vendor.71 The Policy
Statement purported to rely upon the Kirchner language in arriv-
ing at the reasonableness requirement. However, it actually did lit-
tle more than inject the term "reasonable consumer" into every
summary statement that rephrased a particular subrule within the
traditional deception standard.72 The Policy Statement thereby di-
verted attention from the real issue.
By narrowing the Commission's deception enforcement policy to
eliminate liability for subjective statements, and by espousing the
free market philosophy,73 the Policy Statement effectively defined
of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.
Clifidale, 103 F.T.C. at 181 (Policy Statement) (quoting Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290).
69. In Kirchner, the Commission acknowledged that unreasonable consumers had also
been protected under the deception standard: "[A]s has been reiterated many times, the
Commission's responsibility is to prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well as
the cautious and knowledgeable." 63 F.T.C. at 1290; see, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). In Charles of the Ritz, however, the court did not use
the reasonable consumer standard but relies, instead, on "capacity to deceive" language. Id.
at 679-80. Kirchner appears to advocate protection of unreasonable as well as reasonable
consumers.
70. See, e.g., In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 178 & nn. 21-22 (1984) (Policy
Statement) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 511 (1980), af'd, 676 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1982)); Jay Norris Corp., 91 F.T.C 751, 836 (1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979);
Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719, 749, af'd, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir 1976); National Comm'n on
Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 185 (1976), enforced in part, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977);
Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
72. "When representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audience ... the
Commission determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that group."
Cliffdale 103 F.T.C. at 179 (Policy Statement) ("substantial numbers" test); see supra notes
37-41 and accompanying text. "When a seller's representation conveys more than one mean-
ing to reasonable consumers, one of which is false, the seller is liable for the misleading
interpretation. 103 F.T.C. at 178 (Policy Statement) ("literal interpretation" or "double
meaning" rule); see supra note 27 and accompanying text. "As it has in the past, the Com-
mission will evaluate the entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing in determin-
ing how reasonable consumers are likely to respond." Id. at 179 ("total impression" test)
(emphasis added); see supra note 27.
73. "Certain practices, however, are unlikely to deceive consumers acting reasonably.
Thus, the Commission generally will not bring advertising cases based on subjective claims
(taste, feel, appearance, smell) or on correctly stated opinion claims if consumers under-
stand the source and limitations of the opinion." Clifidale, 103 F.T.C. at 181 (Policy State-
ment) (footnote omitted).
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"reasonable" consumer conduct for future Commission cases.7 4
Under the Policy Statment view, reasonableness, requires the con-
sumer to match wits with the more astute vendor who often has
given considerable time and attention to developing promotional
techniques designed to encourage the buyer to make an unreasona-
ble decision.
75
Materiality is the third element of the Policy Statement's decep-
tion standard. Materiality is generally defined as a practice or mis-
representation which is likely to affect a consumer's decision .7  Ex-
press claims are presumptively material while materiality may be
inferred in implied claims.7 Claims or omissions that concern
health or safety are material as is information that is relevant to
critical product features.7 s To this extent, the Policy Statement's
definition of materiality mirrors the traditional definition.7 9 How-
ever, the Policy Statement added language asserting that where
there is a finding of materiality, "injury is likely."80
This indirect approach is actually a step backward from the stat-
utory definition endorsed by Chairman Miller. The earlier con-
struction was explicit in its coverage of the injury element," while
74. Miller predicted that the free market influence would affect future Commission
cases:
Finally, as a matter of policy, when consumers can easily evaluate the product or
service, it is inexpensive, and it is frequently purchased, the Commission will examine
the practice closely before issuing a complaint based on deception. There is little in-
centive for sellers to misrepresent (either by an explicit false statement or a deliber-
ate false implied statement) in these circumstances since they normally would seek to
encourage repeat purchases. Where, as here, market incentives place strong con-
straints on the likelihood of deception, the Commission will examine a practice
closely before proceeding.
Id.
75. In his dissenting statement appended to the Policy Statement, former Commissioner
Pertschuk expressed concern for the consumer who might act unreasonably under such
conditions:
[A] small segment of our society makes its livelihood preying upon consumers who
are very trusting and unsophisticated. Others specialize in weakening the defenses of
especially vulnerable, but normally cautious consumers. Through skillful exploitation
of such common desires as the wish to get rich quick or to provide some measure of
security for one's old age, professional con men can prompt conduct that many of
their victims will readily admit-in hindsight-is patently unreasonable.
Id. at 186-87.
76. Id. at 182.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 182-83.
79. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
80. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 175-76 (Policy Statement).
81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the Policy Statement version includes it only in summary
fashion.2
This distinction is important because by the time Cliffdale Asso-
ciates was decided, "consumer injury" had become a permanent
subpart of the materiality requirement rather than a key element
of the deception standard. 3 The rationale for the Policy State-
ment's shift is twofold: (1) under the traditional standard, actual
injury was never required to support a deception claim;84 and (2)
the injury factor had received such severe criticism, both from
within and outside the Commission, that there seemed to be little
support for the idea.85 Rather than undermine the future viability
of the Policy Statement, the majority allowed this aspect of the
standard to assume a secondary importance.
IV. MARCH 1984: Cliffdale Associates
After Congress had rejected the proposed statutory definition of
deception and the Policy Statement, the Commission majority
adopted the revised deception standard in Cliffdale Associates."
Cliffdale was the first deception case to be appealed to the full
Commission after adoption of the Policy Statement, and it legiti-
mized the "reasonable consumer" approach. Cliffdale involved a
mail order firm which had been marketing a device known as the
"Ball-Matic Gas Saver Valve," claiming that it would provide con-
sumers with substantial gas mileage savings. The Commission
charged that such claims were deceptive8 8 and that Cliffdale did
82. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 175-76 (Policy Statement).
83. In Cliffdale, the Commission stated "[als noted in the Commission's policy state-
ment, a material representation, omission, act or practice involves information that is im-
portant to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding a
product. Consumers thus are likely to suffer injury from a material misrepresentation."
Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165-66. (emphasis added).
84. See supra note 36 for supporting case law.
85. See Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 188, 196-97 (Pertschuk & Bailey, Comm'rs, concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 86-
87 (statements of John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, representing the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General).
86. Clifidale, 103 F.T.C. at 110.
87. The following claims were made regarding the Ball-Matic: "4 Extra Miles Per Gal-
lon"; "100 Extra Miles Between Fill-ups"; "Save up to $200 a year on Gas"; "Tested and
Proven, up to 20% increase in fuel economy." Id. at 116, 117 (complaint). The Ball-Matic
was also represented as a unique product which was needed on all vehicles except Volk-
swagens, diesel vehicles and fuel-injection vehicles. Id. at 158 (initial decision by Brown,
A.L.J.).
88. Id. at 113.
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not have a reasonable basis to substantiate its scientific tests
claims. 9 The FTC also charged that there had not been full disclo-
sure regarding the relationship between the company and those
persons providing endorsements.9 0
The administrative law judge concluded that Cliffdale's adver-
tisements were deceptive and stated that "any advertising repre-
sentation that has the tendency and capacity to mislead or deceive
a prospective purchaser is an unfair and deceptive practice which
violates the FTCA." 91 Chairman Miller, writing for the majority,
seized the opportunity to overturn the "capacity to deceive" stan-
dard.2 As to the administrative law judge's summary of the law of
deception Miller stated:
We find this approach to deception and violations of Section 5 to be
circular and therefore inadequate to provide guidance on how a de-
ception claim should be analyzed. Accordingly, we believe it appro-
priate for the Commission to articulate a clear and understandable
standard for deception.
Consistent with its Policy Statement on Deception,. .. the Com-
mission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there is a rep-
resentation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the
representation, omission, or practice is material.9 3
The Chairman relied upon the rationale articulated in the Policy
Statement. He reasoned that the "likely to mislead" element was
consistent with the "long established principle that the Commis-
sion need not find actual deception . . . ."" He also relied on
Kirchner to support his conclusion that the reasonable consumer
requirement was not a departure from past case holdings.9 5 Chair-
man Miller also cited the same cases cited by the Policy Statement
to substantiate the new deception standard. 6
89. The company had represented that the test results reflected what a typical consumer
could expect. Id. at 112.
90. Id. at 113 (complaint).
91. Id. at 153 (initial decision by Brown, A.L.J.). This language was also quoted in the
Commission's opinion. Id. at 164.
92. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
93. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 164-65 (emphasis added). Chairman Miller also pointed out
that the Commission's earlier approach to deciding deception cases was consistent with the
terminology of the reasonable consumer standard despite the use of terms like "'tendency'
or 'capacity' to deceive." Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id. at 165 n.8.
96. Id. at notes 165-66, nn. 5-14.
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The Commission broke down Cliffdale's product claims into four
categories: descriptive claims, scientific tests claims, consumer en-
dorsements claims, and lack of a reasonable basis for performance
claims. As to the descriptive claims, the majority found that the
company had expressly touted the Ball-Matic as an "amazing au-
tomobile discovery" and as "the most significant automotive
breakthrough in the last ten years. '97 From these claims, the Com-
mission concluded that "a consumer would be reasonable in ex-
pecting the average savings from the Ball-Matic to be within the
stated range . "..."98
The majority opinion found the descriptive claims to be material
because the company had claimed that the product was needed on
every car. In fact, the product enhanced gas mileage minimally.99
Cliffdale's claim "would tend to induce all consumers [including
those owning cars for which the product has no utility] to buy the
device.'' 100 Finally, the Commission noted its prerogative of infer-
ring the materiality of express claims. 101
Cliffdale concluded from its scientific tests that up to a "20 per-
cent increase in fuel economy" was possible through use of the de-
vice. 10 2 The majority found that these advertisements violated the
Policy Statement deception standard, because they could be "rea-
sonably understood to imply that competent scientific tests sup-
port the performance claims made for the Ball-Matic.' ' 0 3 The
Commission disposed of the materiality issue with the mere con-
clusion that consumers could not evaluate the product's perform-
ance claims, and would therefore, be likely to rely on the scientific
support provided by the company. 104
To endorse the Ball-Matic, Cliffdale hired people who were por-
trayed as current, actual users of the product to talk about their
97. Id. at 166 (opinion of the Commission).
98. Id. at 167.
99. Id. at 168.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 169. See supra note 93 for additional claims made in Ball-Matic
advertisements.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 170. The Commission also connected the injury element to its finding of ma-
teriality as to the scientific tests claim: "Clearly these false claims injured consumers by
misleading them on a material point." Id.
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gas mileage savings.0 5 The Commission found that reasonable con-
sumers could conclude that all Ball-Matic users would experience
similar gas mileage savings, when in fact, they would not.
The Commission also found that the company's failure to reveal
that many of the testimonialists were business associates of the
product's marketers violated the "Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising."10 Absent full dis-
closure of this material connection, the consumer is more likely to
accord more weight to an endorsement. This renders the undis-
closed fact material.10 7 Finally, based on the substantiation doc-
trine, the Commission concluded that Cliffdale did not have a rea-
sonable basis to support its performance claims. Accordingly, they
were held to be presumptively false and deceptive.'08
Both dissenting commissioners concurred in the result, but dis-
agreed with the application of the reasonable consumer test. Com-
missioner Bailey was especially concerned that such a straightfor-
ward deception case had been chosen to change the standards. 10 9
Both dissenters commented on the semantic changes in the two
standards, comparing "likely" to "tendency," and concluded that
the reasonable consumer standard would certainly raise the evi-
105. Id. at 172. The advertisements represented that the testimonials:
1. prove that the Ball-Matic significantly improves fuel economy;
2. were obtained from individuals or other entities who, at the time of providing their
endorsements, were independent from all of the individuals and entities that have
marketed the Ball-Matic;
3. are statements of persons who have recently used or are currently using the Ball-
Matic; and
4. reflect the typical or ordinary experience of members of the public who have used
the Ball-Matic.
Id.
106. 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0 - .5 (1987). The Guidelines are derived to a large extent from the
Commission's substantiation doctrine which was formalized in In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C.
23 (1972). They govern testimonials provided by both experts and non-experts and also in-
clude provisions relating to celebrity endorsers. 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.3(a), .1(b). The so-called
"material connection" rule was applied by the Commission before adoption of the Guide-
lines in 1980. This rule provides that any connection between seller and endorser must be
disclosed if the consumer audience would not normally expect it and would, therefore, as-
sign undue credibility to the endorsement. Id.
107. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 172-73.
108. Id. at 173. The majority stated: "[O]ur previous discussion regarding the validity of
[Cliffdale's] test claims makes manifest the inadequacy of their substantiation efforts. Ac-
cordingly, we need go no further to conclude that [Cliffdale] did not have a reasonable basis
for their claims, and any representation either implied or express, that they did, was false
and deceptive." Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 189 (Bailey, Comm'r, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
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dentiary threshhold for all deception cases 110 The dissenters saw
little need for altering the federal deception standard when the
representations at issue so blatantly violated the old standards:
This is an uncomplicated case involving a number of advertising
claims, which are clearly false and deceptive, that could have been
addressed with swift and sure justice under existing law. Unfortu-
nately, a majority of the Commission has chosen to use the case as a
vehicle to set forth a new legal standard which has little to do with
the case and much to do with an ill-advised undertaking to rewrite
the law of deception."'
The majority did deviate in two significant ways from the decep-
tion standard set forth in the Policy Statement. The Commission
noted that the "likely to mislead" element reflected the well estab-
lished principle that a finding of actual deception was not required
in order to hold an act or practice deceptive. 112 The case law em-
phatically supports this conclusion. In Charles of the Ritz Dist.
Corp. v. FTC,"' the court stated: "That the Commission did not
produce consumers to testify to their deception does not make the
order improper, since actual deception of the public need not be
shown in Federal Trade Commission proceedings.""1 4 The court
was acknowledging that the Commission is capable of deciding
whether a representation is deceptive without consumer testimony
that an actual deception had occurred. While seeming to embrace
this general concept, the majority left a considerable question re-
garding the role that consumer testimony might play in future
cases. In analyzing the Ball-Matic's descriptive claims, the Com-
mission noted: "Evidence as to how consumers actually interpreted
these advertisements was not introduced into the record. While
such evidence would have been useful, the Commission believes it
can, in this case, interpret the claims as a reasonable consumer
would have.11 5 The obvious question that arises from this com-
110. Id. at 190-91, 184-85 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
111. Id. at 189-90. Commissioner Bailey was particularly concerned that Commission
proceedings would become mired in the potentially litigable issue of whether a consumer
interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 193; see also Bailey & Pertschuk, The Law of Deception:
The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 849 (1984).
112. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165.
113. 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
114. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
115. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 167, n.17.
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ment is what would the Commission have done if the facts in
Cliffdale had been different. It is fair to assume that since the
claims and representations were so easily categorized as deceptive
regardless of which standard was employed, the majority had little
difficulty in reaching a decision despite an absence of consumer
testimony. Does this mean, however, that future Commissions may
look to Cliffdale as a basis for requiring testimony regarding actual
deception in other cases?116 Such a result would certainly reinforce
Miller's view that the actual deception and "likely to mislead" ele-
ments are interchangeable.
The Cliffdale majority did not resurrect the controversial con-
sumer injury requirement for materiality that had originally been a
part of the proposed statutory version,1  and was a key element in
the reasonable consumer standard. a8 The majority followed the
Policy Statement view that if a practice is material, then consumer
injury is likely, although not definite."1 9 However, dissenting Com-
missioner Pertschuk noted a link between actual deception and
materiality.2 0 In his view, to require actual deception would be to
require a change in the materiality definition so that a consumer
injury would be necessary in order for the deceptive practice to be
material.12 A consumer who has been actually deceived, but who
has suffered no injury, would not qualify under the reasonable con-
116. Commissioner Bailey identified this inconsistency in the majority opinion:
At one point the [majority] opinion seems to equate materiality with the actual ef-
fects of claims or practices on consumer conduct, and the Policy Statement expressly
states that 'injury and materiality are different names for the same concept' and that
'deception' will be found where an act or practice 'misleads to the consumer's detri-
ment.' (Detriment is, of course, legally defined as injury). The Policy Statement also
notes that injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently 'but for' the mis-
leading act or practice, suggesting that reliance and causation are elements of
materiality.
While I don't pretend to understand the full import of these statements, they
certainly imply the possible imposition in at least some cases of new evidentiary
requirements that are contrary to current law.
Id. at 196 (Bailey, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added and
footnotes omitted).
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the original statutory definition of
deception.
118. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
119. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165-66.
120. Id. at 189 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If the
majority commissioners intend to require proof of actual or likely reliance on the misrepre-
sentations of respondents in future cases, they have changed the meaning of materiality and
made it more difficult to establish violations of Section 5.").
121. Id. at 188-89.
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sumer standard. 22 Thus, Cliffdale Associates became the medium
by which the Commission formally adopted the Policy Statement's
deception standard.
V. POST 1984: ANALYSIS OF THE Cliffdale CASELINE
In re Thompson Medical Co.123 represented the next application
of the reasonable consumer standard following Cliffdale.24 The
FTC charged the company with making a variety of false and de-
ceptive claims about its product called "aspercreme." In an exten-
sive advertising campaign, Thompson referred to the ointment as
"a remarkable breakthrough for arthritis pain, "125 and compared it
with aspirin. The ads emphasized that aspercreme is applied di-
rectly to the affected body area, that it penetrates deep into the
body, that the product can be used without stomach upset, and
that it works faster than aspirin.2 6 The Commission charged that
Thompson stated directly or implied that aspercreme contains as-
pirin, that the ointment is a recently developed drug, and that the
company had valid, scientific studies proving aspercreme's superi-
ority to aspirin.2 7 The complaint concluded by stating that these
advertisements violated FTCA section 5 because they had the "ca-
pacity and tendency to mislead members of the consuming public
into the erroneous and mistaken belief that said representations
were and are true."' 2 s The administrative law judge agreed with
the FTC and ordered that: (1) Thompson include in all its adver-
tisements a disclosure that aspercreme does not contain aspirin,
(2) Thompson display a similar disclaimer on all product labeling,
and (3) the company not misrepresent test results so as to convey
the impression that a reasonable basis exists to support product
claims.
129
Before analyzing Thompson's advertising claims, the Commis-
sion established the precedential effect of Cliffdale. It justified the
reasonable consumer standard by stating that advertisers should
122. This result is consistent with Commissioner Pertschuk's overall view that the pur-
pose of the change in standards "is to withdraw the protection of Section 5 from consumers
who do not act 'reasonably.'" Id. at 185.
123. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).
124. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
125. 104 F.T.C. at 657 (Complaint).
126. Id; see also id. at 652-56 (Radio TV Reports, Exhibit A-E).
127. Id. at 650.
128. Id. at 651.
129. Id. at 842-44.
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not operate in constant fear of potential deception claims that are
based on unreasonable consumer interpretations. 130 This rationale,
although not specifically made part of the Cliffdale ruling, gener-
ally reflected the Commission majority's view that the marketplace
was an effective regulator of deceptive advertising.
The claims made by Thompson regarding aspercreme did not in-
volve outright, express misrepresentations. Instead, the allegations
of deception hinged upon whether the implied claims made by the
advertisements were sufficient to mislead a reasonable consumer.
One such implied claim was whether aspercreme contained aspi-
rin.13' The Commission analyzed the average consumer's general
understanding of the word "aspirin" and noted that "the ads were
drafted with an artful choice of words to make what Thompson
thought were literally correct statements" regarding aspercreme's
comparable pain-relieving capacities.3 2 Concluding that the net
impression of Thompson's implied claims was adequate to mislead
a reasonable consumer, the Commission upheld the administrative
law judge's decision and specified the manner in which the com-
pany must affirmatively disclose the absence of aspirin in
aspercreme.
33
In re International Harvester Co.13 4 marked the third applica-
tion of the new deception standard. Unlike Cliffdale and Thomp-
130. Id. at 788 (opinion of the Commission). The Commission stated:
The purpose of such a requirement is to ensure that the flow of useful, accurate infor-
mation to consumers will not be deterred by advertisers' fears that they could be held
responsible for claims that they could not reasonably have known consumers were
going to receive from the ads in question.
Id.
131. Thompson, 104 F.T.C. at 791.
132. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 843. The disclosure order was very specific as to all types of advertisements:
(1) In television advertisements, an explicit simple aspirin disclaimer statement
(such as 'ASPIRIN-FREE') shall be superimposed on the television screen simultane-
ously with a vocal aspirin disclaimer statement (such as 'Aspercreme does not contain
aspirin') at the end of each advertisement.
(2) In radio advertisements, an explicit aspirin disclaimer statement (such as 'As-
PERCREME DOES NOT CONTAIN ASPIRIN') shall be made at the end of each advertisement.
(3) In print advertisements, an explicit aspirin disclaimer statement (such as 'As-
PERCREME DOES NOT CONTAIN ASPIRIN') shall be displayed prominently and conspicu-
ously in relation to each such advertisement as a whole.
(4) In labeling, an explicit aspirin disclaimer statement (such as 'DOES NOT
CONTAIN ASPIRIN') shall be prominently and conspicuously printed on the front
package panel (or in the front of the container if no package is used).
Id.
134. 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
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son, however, the Commission ruled that the practice at issue was
not deceptive under FTCA section 5.135 From 1939 through 1975,
Harvester had marketed a line of farm tractors which were subject
to a phenomenon known as "fuel geysering.' 1 36 Because the gas
tank was placed near the engine, the fuel was put through a heat-
ing and vaporization process which caused tremendous pressure to
build inside the tank. This would occur during normal operating
conditions, and if the gas cap were removed or had not been prop-
erly tightened, the heated fuel would spray up to twenty feet from
the tractor and ignite spontaneously.1 3 7 As a result, a number of
tractor operators were seriously injured and at least one person
died.'
The administrative law judge held that Harvester's failure to is-
sue a proper, timely hazard warning to its consumer operators con-
stituted "unfair and deceptive acts and practices and unfair meth-
ods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'1
3 9
Finding that Harvester's actions constituted a "pure omis-
sion,"140 the Commission determined that the evidence supported
the unfair practice claim but not the deception claim.' 4 The Com-
mission refused to accept the judge's conclusion that Harvester's
knowledge of the fuel geysering problem since 1955 constituted
deception.1
42
135. The Commission stated:
While failure to disclose certain material facts may cause consumer injury and lead to
liability under Section 5, it is important to distinguish between the circumstances
under which such omissions are deceptive-in that they are likely to cause injury to
consumers by affirmatively misleading their informed choice-and the circumstances
under which they amount to an unfair practice-one which causes substantial, una-
voidable injury to consumers that is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits.
We do not find that the facts describe a practice which causes injury by deception,
and so we reverse that conclusion of the initial decision.
Id. at 1050-51 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 950 (Complaint).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1049.
140. The majority described a "pure omission" as "a subject upon which the seller has
simply said nothing, in circumstances that do not give any particular meaning to his si-
lence." Id. at 1059.
141. The Commission defined an unfair practice as one causing substantial injury to con-
sumers and not overcome by any counter benefits. Id. at 1051. A deceptive practice was
described as one likely to injure a consumer by materially altering her choice selection pro-
cess. Id. at 1050-51; see supra note 135.
142. Id. at 1033 (initial decision).
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The Commission recognized that, under traditional deception
theory,14 3 deception may occur where a seller fails to disclose cer-
tain facts in such a manner so as to create a misrepresentation.
4 4
In Harvester, however, the Commission found that it would not be
economically feasible to call all omissions deceptive, 4 5 and there-
fore distinguished between "pure" and "non-pure" omissions. It
noted that pure omissions exist where the seller has said nothing
and such silence has no particular meaning. The Commission was
concerned that a tremendous economic burden would be imposed
on the seller if all potential consumer interpretations had to be
considered in order to avoid a deception charge. 46 Pure omissions
are also not deliberate, and it therefore must be considered
whether any "corrective disclosure would necessarily engender pos-
itive net benefits for consumers or be in the public interest.'
47
Thus, a finding of deception was justified only when an applica-
tion of a cost-benefit analysis to the omission resulted in a signifi-
cant gain to consumers. 48 In this case, the complaint charged that
Harvester's silence resulted in a breach of the implied warranty of
fitness.149 Applying the cost-benefit theory, however, the full Com-
mission held that an undisclosed safety risk is not presumptively a
warranty breach since the key is the "degree of risk involved."'150
Since there is only a small risk of harm, it cannot be said that a
product is inappropriate for normal usage.' 5'
Consequently, pure omissions do not fulfill the first part of the
reasonable consumer deception policy which requires a misrepre-
143. Id. at 1058.
144. Id. at 1057 (opinion).
145. Id. at 1059.
146. Id. The majority opinion categorized the potential misconceptions as "literally infi-
nite," id., and detailed the problems that would beset sellers:
Since the seller will have no way of knowing in advance which disclosure is important
to any particular consumer, he will have to make complete disclosures to all. A televi-
sion ad would be completely buried under such disclaimers, and even a full-page
newspaper ad would hardly be sufficient for the purpose. For example, there are liter-
ally dozens of ways in which one can be injured while riding a tractor, not all them
obvious before the fact, and under a simple deception analysis these would presuma-
bly all require affirmative disclosure. The resulting costs and burden on advertising
communication would very possibly represent a net harm for consumers.
Id. at 1060 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1059.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1058.
150. Id. at 1063.
151. Id.
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sentation. 15' An evaluation of the "degree of risk involved" in Har-
vester's pure omission showed that the geysering accident rate had
been less than .001 percent over a forty-year period,5 3 and that
use of the tractor could not be considered "inherently unreasona-
ble or imprudent.' 1 54 The Harvester ruling's apparent requirement
of a cost-benefit analysis will complicate the streamlined legal pro-
cedures of a deception action in future close cases.'55
The dissent disputed the majority's conclusion that Harvester's
silence did not constitute a deceptive practice. 56 Commissioner
Bailey argued that this was an uncomplicated case involving latent
product safety hazards and the failure of a seller to warn of the
attendant damages. She rejected the Commission's notion that
Harvester's conduct could be construed as unfair but not deceptive
and viewed this diminishment in policy enforcement as an affront
to the existing law of deception. 57 Relying on the fact that Har-
vester knew of the product defects since 1963, the dissent rejected
the conclusion that there was no implied warranty of fitness for
normal use. 58 The dissent also suggested that the majority had tai-
lored its decision to its analysis of the statistical risk of injury




155. Id. at 1063-64.
156. Commissioner Bailey characterized the majority's approach as "entirely novel" and
"nearly incomprehensible" as it related to the existing law of deception. Id. at 1077 (Bailey,
Comm'r, dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1078 (citing Stupell Enterprises, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965)). Commissioner
Bailey pointed out that Harvester did nothing to change the fuel warning instructions from
1963-1976 and that manufacturers have an obligation to disclose nonobvious safety hazards.
In StupeU, the Commission observed that:
The Federal Trade Commission Act imposes no requirement of disclosing the risks of
breakage where those risks are obvious or apparent, for in such a case non-disclosure
is not deceptive. We merely apply to the facts here the well-established rule that
where breakage is likely to occur in the normal use of the product, and the hazards of
such breakage are not apparent or obvious, at least to many consumers, non-disclo-
sure of such risk is deceptive and therefore unlawful.
Stupell Enterprises Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173, 187 (1965).
159. Id. at 1078 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting). The dissent noted that the failure to dis-
close material facts may have the capacity to mislead even where the representation is
presented in an overall truthful context. Id. at 1079. Bailey went on to summarize the Com-
mission's view in previous omission cases: "[D]eception may occur when important informa-
tion is omitted from the sales presentation or from other aspects of a commercial transac-
tion. While in order to be material a misleading omission must generally pertain to a
consumer's purchasing decision, it may also concern the use or care of a product." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
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Bailey rejected any link between these two factors, preferring in-
stead to focus on the Commission's previous treatment of omis-
sions. She pointed out that implied misrepresentations have long
been viewed as "an integral part of the law of deception,"'160 due in
part to the Commission's desire to protect consumers from any jus-
tifiable but erroneous assumptions about product safety. 16' Reli-
ance upon a cost-benefit analysis that focused on actual accidents
rather than those that could reasonably be expected to happen im-
paired the Commission's consumer protection goal by carving out a
separate category of conduct for special treatment-that of pure
omissions.62
The reasonable consumer standard has been upheld by a federal
appellate court. In In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc.6 3 three compa-
nies were charged with making deceptive representations in land
sales advertising. The companies sold parcels in Western Texas va-
rying in size from five to forty acres. Representations were made
that the land was suitable for building homes, personal farming, or
noncommercial ranching. 16  Additionally, prospective purchasers
were provided with maps showing ongoing oil exploration in the
immediate vicinity and representing that land values would rise
dramatically as a result of oil companies establishing permanent
operations in the area.6 5 It was also misrepresented both orally
and in writing that a nuclear power plant might be built locally.
Southwest Sunsites used this potential for commercial develop-
ment to bolster its advertising claims that the land was a good in-
vestment.6 " The administrative law judge rejected the FTC's argu-




161. Porter & Dietsch v. F.T.C., 90 F.T.C. 770, 873-74 (1977), afJ'd, 605 F.2d 294, 303
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); see also Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 176 (Pol-
icy Statement).
162. International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1083-84.
163. 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
164. Id. at 38 (initial decision). Count II of the complaint charged that such claims were
misrepresentations because of the questionable availability and cost of utilities, the subdi-
vider's failure to complete prescribed improvements, and actions by the subdividers which
caused a substantial impairment of the buyers' ability to use their lots for the purposes
promised by the sellers. Id. at 11. The complaint went on to allege that had the buyers been
aware of these nondisclosed factors, their decision to purchase would have been materially
affected. Id.
165. Id. at 21-22.
166. Potential buyers were told variously that "a lot of exploration" for oil had been
conducted locally, and that there was "great potential."
167. Id. at 99.
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The Commission, which was unanimous in its decision to over-
turn the judge's decision, found that the meaning of Southwest's
express representation was clear and thus did not require further
interpretation.16 8 The majority said "that consumers acting reason-
ably in the circumstances would have interpreted them precisely as
they were made."16 9 As to implied representations, the Commission
clarified that the Cliffdale standard looked to the manner in which
consumers would reasonably have interpreted the representations.
The Commission appeared to retreat somewhat from this position
in a footnote which confused the issue whether the new deception
standard focuses primarily on potential consumer conduct or pos-
sible consumer interpretations.7 0 From a -defrauded consumer's
point of view, however, proving interpretations would be much eas-
ier than proving what constitutes reasonable consumer conduct.
Even if Southwest Sunsites represents a step back toward the
traditional deception standard, that step may arguably be negated
by the language of Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion. The court upheld the Commission's decision that FTCA sec-
tion 5 had been violated 71 and found that the Commission had not
violated the Administrative Procedures Act in establishing the new
deception standard.7 2 It also concluded that the "likely to mis-
lead" standard imposes a higher burden of proof on the FTC in
168. Id. at 147. While concurring in the Commission's conclusion Commissioner Bailey
concluded that Southwest Sunsites had engaged in deceptive trade practices, Commissioner
Bailey refused to endorse the Cliffdale reasonable consumer standard. The opinion stated:
Commissioner Bailey believes that respondents' practices here were deceptive and
violated Section 5 of the FTC Act because they tended to mislead a substantial num-
ber of consumers in a material way by presenting respondents' land, inaccurately, as
attractive, money-making investment property that was suitable for a wide range of
uses and that did not have any significant drawbacks or limitations. 'She also agrees
that these practices were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances in a material way, though she does not endorse the use of this
standard.
Id. at 147 n.79 (emphasis added).
169. 105 F.T.C. at 148.
170. In this footnote, Commissioner Bailey stated: "It is important to remember that
this evaluation does not focus on whether it was reasonable for consumers to believe or act
on the representations at issue. It focuses instead on whether consumers could reasonably
interpret the advertising or statements to convey the implied representations." Id. at 148
n.80.
171. In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
172. Id. at 1435.
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deception cases. 1 3 Thus, at least one appellate court has found the
new standard to be a significant departure from past Commission
precedent.
The FTC most recently dealt with the deception issue in In re
Figgie International, Inc., 4 which involved the manufacturer of
fixed-temperature "Vanguard" heat detectors. The company sold
the heat detectors, and smoke detectors procured from outside
manufacturers, through a nationwide distributor network. 75 Dis-
tributors conducted in-home sales presentations,' e using promo-
tional literature and slide presentations provided by the company.
The promotional material claimed that heat detectors provide im-
mediate early warning of fires and do so faster than smoke detec-
tors. 7 7 One information bulletin stated that "Heat Detectors Have
Probably Saved More Lives And Property Than Any Other Fire
Protection Device."'78 In its complaint the FTC charged that the
company inappropriately represented that: 1) the Vanguard heat
detectors provide sufficient warning to allow home occupants to es-
cape a fire, and 2) that the combination of heat and smoke detec-
tors "provide significantly greater fire warning protection for occu-
pants than smoke detectors alone.' 7 9  On appeal, the full
Commission upheld the decision of the administrative law judge
that Figgie's promotional tools were deceptive. 80
Citing International Harvester and Cliffdale, the Commission
stated that Figgie's conduct was governed by the "likely to mis-
173. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Each of the three elements of the new standard challenged by petitioner impose$ a
greater burden of proof on the FTC to show a violation of Section 5. First, the FTC
must show probable, not possible, deception ("likely to mislead," not "tendency and
capacity to mislead"). Second, the FTC must show potential deception of "consum-
ers acting reasonably in the circumstances," not just any consumers. Third, the new
standard considers as material only deceptions that are likely to cause injury to a
reasonably relying consumer, whereas the old standard reached deceptions that a
consumer might have considered important, whether or not there was reliance.
Id. at 1436 (emphasis added to first sentence only).
174. 107 F.T.C. 313 (1986).
175. Id. at 317-18 (initial decision).
176. Id. at 318.
177. The materials used during the in-home presentation included: testimonial letters,
slide shows, booklets, brochures, demonstration materials, and government fire study ex-
cerpts. All the promotional literature was aimed at convincing the consumer to purchase
Vanguard heat detectors in systems that contain a nominal number of smoke detectors. Id.
at 320.
178. Id. at 325.
179. Id. at 314 (complaint).
180. Id. at 396 (opinion of the Commission).
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lead" deception standard.181 As presented, the deception standard
was virtually identical to that articulated in Cliffdale, and there
was no discussion of whether consumer injury was an integral part
of the standard.8
The Commission first dealt with the question of materiality and
concluded that Figgie's claims could be presumed material for two
reasons. First, express claims are always presumed material. Sec-
ond, representations which relate to the primary features of the
product are likewise presumed material.'
The Commission reviewed record evidence of independent tests
refuting the company's claim that heat detectors provide adequate
warning to allow most people to escape safely from a residential
fire.184 To decide the impact upon a reasonable consumer of Fig-
gie's promotional claim that heat detectors provide significantly
greater fire protection than smoke detectors alone, the Commission
reviewed the basis for this claim independently.
The company claimed that heat detectors are more appropriate
in certain rooms where smoke detectors are not generally recom-
mended, such as the kitchen, where false alarms may be caused by
cooking smoke. 8 5 The Commission concluded that such claims
were not deceptive unless they were unsupported by substantiating
evidence. 88
181. Id. at 374.
182. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
183. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. at 378-79. The Commission also noted that Figgie did
not offer any evidence to rebut the finding of materiality. Id. at 379.
184. Id. at 380-83. Two major independent testing programs contradicted Figgie's claims
about the Vanguard heat detector. In 1978, the California Fire Chiefs' Association Residen-
tial Fire Detector Test Program was conducted. Its purpose was "to investigate and report
on residential fire detector response, reliability, and life safety potentials under realistic con-
ditions." Id. at 380. A one-story and a two-story house were used to simulate actual condi-
tions encountered in a residential fire. The houses were completely furnished and equipped
with a wide variety of fire detectors. Id. at 381.
The second testing series, the Indiana Dunes Tests, was conducted from 1974 to 1976 by
the National Bureau of Standards and Underwriters' Laboratories. Procedures were similar
to those in the California Fire Chiefs' Test Program. In all of the tests, a smoke detector was
the first to sound an alarm. Additionally, the smoke detectors always allowed persons more
time to escape than did the heat detectors. Due to criticism of the Dunes I test result, the
Vanguard heat detector was tested in a Dunes II program. Vanguard's performance in
Dunes II was considerably poorer than in Dunes I. Id. at 382.
185. Id. at 389.
186. Id. at 390. The Commission further stated that such claims "must not exaggerate
the extent of that additional protection and must disclose any qualifying information
needed to correct misimpressions the claims would otherwise cause." Id.
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Figgie also asserted that heat detectors provide additional safety
because they are mechanically activated and do not depend on an
electrical power supply or batteries, both of which cannot be relied
upon to operate properly during a residential fire."'7 The Commis-
sion concluded that this claim would be deceptive if it was exag-
gerated or not substantiated by additional evidence.18
Finally, Figgie contended that the heat detector is superior to a
smoke detector in its ability to provide earlier warning of a fire.189
The independent tests refuted this claim and constituted the sole
basis for the Commission's finding that Figgie had made a false
representation.8 0
In response to Commissioner Bailey's complaint that the tradi-
tional deception standard should have been applied, the Commis-
sion stated that Figgie's practices "were deceptive under either
analysis of a deceptive act or practice."' 9'
Thus, the Figgie case does not continue the major shift in decep-
tion enforcement policy that was seen in International Harvester
Co.192 Figgie does suggest, however, that the Policy Statement's
"likely to mislead" standard is not likely to become entrenched in




The change in deception standards advocated by the 1983 Policy
Statement represented a significant shift in consumer protection.
Under the traditional standard, the Commission sought to protect
consumers from all potential adverse consequences of deceptive
187. Id. at 391. Figgie emphasized that the simplicity of the heat detector made it a
more reliable fire protection device. Numerous experts testified on the company's behalf to
endorse this claim. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 392 n.6.
190. See supra note 184.
191. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. at 392. The National Fire Protection Association pro-
vided the Commission additional support. Based on various test results, this Association
concluded: "the results, of full-scale experiments conducted over the past several years...
indicate that detectable quantities of smoke precede detectable levels of heat in nearly all
cases." Id.
192. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text. Although Figgie did not involve
unfair practices, the Commission opinion noted the "pure omission" distinction which had
been drawn in International Harvester. 107 F.T.C. at 379 n.17.
193. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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advertising. Chairman Miller believed that such protection should
only be afforded after the free enterprise system had been allowed
to purge itself of businesses that actively engaged in deceptive pro-
motional practices. The Policy Statement was premised on the be-
lief that consumers are able to protect themselves, and even if a
consumer is deceived once, a prudent consumer will not allow it to
happen a second time.
9 4
Those cases decided after Cliffdale, reveal the Commission's at-
tempt to formalize the new deception standard. The FTC system-
atically employed the "likely to mislead" approach, abandoning
only Chairman Miller's preference for equating materiality with in-
jury.195 These cases are consistent in all respects, except that In-
ternational Harvester mandates that a cost-benefit analysis pre-
cede any application of a streamlined deception procedure. Given
these developments, it is difficult to accept Miller's reassurance
that no significant changes have been made to the FTC's deception
enforcement policy.' There is still substantial disagreement on
this issue, and at the very least, the FTC's deception standard is
still in a state of flux.
194. In a formal statement presented to the Senate Committee on Commerce, former
Chairman Miller stated:
When a product is low in price, is frequently purchased, and is easy to evaluate, there
is no incentive to mislead. Although consumers may purchase the product once, they
will not do so again. Thus, the returns from a single purchase are unlikely to cover
the costs of disseminating the false advertising for a product that meets these condi-
tions. In short, in this class of cases, the market works-deception is not a viable
business strategy.
Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 17 (emphasis added and footnote omit-
ted); see also 103 F.T.C. at 181 (Policy Statement).
195. 103 F.T.C. at 176 (Policy Statement).
196. From the beginning, Chairman Miller viewed his suggested statutory deception
standard as vastly superior to the case law approach developed by the FTC:
[T]he propsed [sic] standard will greatly alleviate, if not eliminate, the many
problems arising under the current statute [FTCA Section 5] with its lack of explicit
standards. The absence of a clear definition of deception has resulted in cases that
are often cited to illustrate the Commission's inappropriate use of its discretion. Even
more importantly, the proposed standard will correct the inadequacy of the present
statute under which consumers and businesses have been injured, rather than
protected.
Deceptive Advertising Hearings, supra note 8, at 20-21.
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